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FISCAL FEDERALISM: REVENUE ALLOCATION FOR
ECONOAAIC DEVELOPTUIENT IN NIGERIA
by

T O. OKUNROUNMU
Deputy Director of Research
Central Bank of Nigeria
INTRODUCTION
From colonial administration to independence in 1960 and 35 years of
self-rule, revenue allocation in the
Federal Republic of Nigeria has had a
chequered history. It has been subject of intensive lobbying by politicians in the attempt to have their
wishes engrained in the Constitution.
The frequencies with which military
administrations rewrite Decrees to
dishibute revenue among the tiers of
government or simply make fundamental ad-hoc changes in the statutory allocation formulae clearly shows
that revenue allocation in Nigeria is
yet an unfinished business. The National Constitutional Conference in
1994 examined the history of revenue allocation in Nigeria with the
main objective of reviewing the current revenue allocation formulae being used. The continuity in the unfinished business of revdnue allocation
in Nigeria is underlined by three proposals that may eventually become
part of the post-military administration in Nigeria after 1998.
During the 1995 National Day Celebration, the Head of State, General
Sani Abacha, announced that:

(i)

new states and localgovernments

might still be created in Nigeria
before the return to civil rule in
1998;

(ii) much of the functions currently
being performed by the Federal
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Government might be transfened
to State and LocalGovernments
to de-emphasize the desire by
politicians to win at the Federal
lever by allmeans; and

(iii) the revenue allocation formulae
would be reviewed by providing
13 per cent of the revenue from
mineralsources to be distributed
according to derivation principles.

These proposals would have far
reaching consequences for revenue allocation in the next republic. And it may in itself lead to
further agitation for review when
the country eventually returns to
civilian rule.
Nominally, Nigeria is a federation with
30 States and 589 Local Govern-

ments, but in reality the country is
administered under the military as a
unitary state. When the civilian regimes are overthrown, the Federal
Constitutions that define intergovernment fiscal relations, ensuring some
measure of autonomy and interdependence to the tiers of government,
are suspended and the provisions
normally become nulland void. The
1963 Federal Constitution which was
designed in the British parliamentary
style was suspended in 1966 during
the first military take over of government in Nigeria. The 1979 Federal
Constitution was patterned after the
American presidential system of
power relations and the 1989 FederalConstitution which was also cast
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in the same mold were suspended
after the overthrow of civilian admin-

istration.

The military administration has
been in power for most of the 36
years since independence while the
federal Constitutions preceding each
military administration had been sus-

pended. It is therefore, difficult to
regard Nigeria strictly as a Federation. Nevertheless, the collective will
of the people remains largely to be a
federation and current national efforts are focused on how to ensure
the emergence of a true federalism in
the nearest future.

This paper is prepared in three
parts. Part I is a theoretical overview
of fiscal federalism while Part II re-

views the Nigerian experience with
Fiscal Federalism. Part III analyses
proposals for an effective fiscal Federalism that would enhance economic development.
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Part I
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
OF FISCAL FEDERALISM
The choice of whether a country becomes a unitary system, confederation or a federation is a politicaldecision. However, such political decisions, once made, have implications
for political governance, fiscal management and economic development

as well as the attainment of social
stability. This section of the paper will
therefore, review economic literature
on fiscal federalism before examining
the Nigerian experience on the subject between 1960 and 1996.
David Hyman defined "Fiscalfederalism as a division of taxing and
expenditure functions among the
levels of government in a federation.
A federal system of administration
allows both a centralised and decentralised collective choices to be met
by each tier of government. The advantage of a federal system is that it
ensures flexibility and regionalor localvariation in the provision of public
goods and services when feasible and
desirable"l. At the same time, it allows the advantage of centralprovision of government services where
uniformity is essential.
The important elements in this
definition are division, taxing and expenditure functions and tiers of government in a federalsystem. Unlike in
a unitary system where these functions are performed solely by the
central government or delegated to
lower tiers of administration, a federalsystem has to contend with multilevels of governmentthat are autonomous and interdependent.
This distinction is important, especially, as it affects the performance of
the public sector role in economic
management. Co-ordination and cooperation are therefore important in
a federal system if allocation of resources is to be efficient and the
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government delivery of public goods
and services effective in meeting socialneeds.
In order to qualify as a federation
there is always a Federal Constitution providing a zeal to the intergovernmental fiscal relationship. Keneth
C. Wheare, writing on FederalGov-

ernmentz, set forth a number of
characteristics that a political system
must possess in order to qualify as a
federal system. These were primarily
constitutional provisions that protect
the autonomy of the different levels
of government. A FederalConstitution is, therefore, crucial in stating
explictly the relationship with respect
to the functions to be performed by
each tier of government and the fi.
nancial resources to be used. The
provisions of federal constitution are
also protected by the courts if there is
any legal dispute as to its true interpretation. Such provisions in the federalconstitution can only be altered
through approvalby the majority of
members of Parliament, and sometimes, supported with a public referendum.
Fiscalfederalism in summary can
be defined as intergovernment fiscal
relations as enshrined in a federal
constitution providing for the functional responsibilities to be performed
by the multi-levels of government
and the financial resources that can
be raised and shared for provision of
coll,active goods and services.
Fiscal federalism recognises that
the role of the state in economic
management may have to be performed by two or three governments
and not one cenhaigovernment as in
a unitary state. Fiscal federalism, by
specifying the functions to be performed by each tier of government
and providing for the financial resources to be used in supplying public goods and services, demands prudence in the management of these
resources in orderto achieve stabilip
and economic development. If this
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delicate balance is disturbed, it may
result in adverse consequences for
economic management and development.

Part II

NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE OF
FISCAL FEDERALISM 1960

-

1996
Nigeria became independent in 1960

and adopted the Federalform of administration with three tiers of Government in 1963. These were the
Federal, Regional and Local Governments. The ntrmber of the secondtier units was increased in 1967 from
4 regions to 12 States in 1976 and
now stands at 30 States. After the
reforms introduced in 1976 following
the restructuring of the country into
12 State, 300 local governments were
established by the Feder6l Government. The number of local government units rose progressively to 589
in 1991. Prior to 1989, the adminis-

tration of local governments

was

placed under the state governments.
However, under administrative re-

forms introduced in 1989, Local
Governments were given some
measure of autonomy including direct funding from the Federation
Account.
Although Nigeria retains the physical structure of federalism, the constitution over the years had remained
suspended with every military takeover from civilian regimes. The Nigerian experience of fiscal federalism
has been influenced largely by the
transposition of military rule. Under
military administration, the prevailing command system tends to reduce
the administration of the country into
a unitary state, as all the State Gov-

ernments receive instructions from
the military leader at the centre who
is also the Head of State and Commander-in -Chief of the Armed Forces.
The Reports of Aboyade Committee
on Revenue Allocation observed with
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respectto the impact of military intervention on federalism:
"Since the military came to power,

the practice of federalism and power
structure between the states and the
centre have undergone fundamental
changes. In the first place, Decree No.

1 of 1966 vests the Federal Military
Government with power to make laws
for Nigeria with respect to any matter. A
state Governor, an appointee of the
Supreme Military Council, derives his
authority from the Head of State and
must obtain prior permission from him
before creating legislation on matters in
the concurrent legislative list. Such sub-

ordinate - superordinance relationships
do not of course exactly enhance the
free play of intergovernmental relationships normally associated with federal
political arrangements. "

'l'his scenario does not hold under
civilian regimes where a state may be
under a different political party and
ideology from the government at the
cenhe. The taxing and expenditure

functions as provided in the suspended Federal Constitutions are
reviewed below.

Allocation of Functions
The 1963 Federal Constitution allocated the functions to be performed
by the Federal and Regional Governments under two main headings.
These are exclusive federal and con-

current legislative lists. Local Governments were treated implicitly as
part of the Regional'and later State
Governments. However, the 1979
Federal Constitution identified functions to be perforrned by the Local
Governments uncier the fourth
schedule. These functions are summarized below:

Executive List

All functions under the Exclusive
Legislative List are to be performed
by the Federal Government and in-

clude Accounts of Government of
the Federation; issue of Legaltender
currency; External Affairs; Defence,
38
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etc. Overthe years,s there have been

amendments to the contents of the
Exclusive Legislative. List but the
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Revenue Allocation Commissions

Our search for equitable revenue allocation formulae in support of the
overriding principles remain, that
functional roles to be performed by
these are functions to be performed
the governments predated indeby the Federal Government alone.
pendence. The firstCommission was
established by the colonial adminisConcurrent Legislative List
trators \n 7946 when Nigeria was
All subjects listed under the concunent
being ruled as a unitary state. This
Legislative List are to be performed was the Phillipson Commission. Three
by both the Federal and State/Re- other Commissions were appointed
gional Governments. These include by the British Government to help
Antiquities, Census, Higher Educa- proffer solutions to the problems of
tion, Indushial development, Prisons, revenue allocation in the country.
NationalParks, etc.
These were Hicks-Phillipson Commission (1951), Chicks Commission
Functions of Local Government
(1953) and Raisman Commission
The functional roles of the local gov- (1958), the last before independence.
ernments are listed in the fourth The issue of revenue allocation reSchedule of the1979 and 1989 Fed- occurred immediately after indeeral constitutions. The Local Gov- pendence aird the old method of
ernments arc expected to provide appointing commissions was resorted
public goods and services, such as to by the FederalGovernment.
Between 1960 and 1979, lhere
primary schools, maintenance of
markets, cemeteries, home for the were four different Revenue Allocadestitute and infirm, public conven- tion Commissions appointed to proiences, refuse disposals, etc. as weil vide equitable revenue allocation
as other functions that may be con- formulae for the country. These were
ferred on them by the State House of the Binns Commission (1964), Dina
Commission ( 1968), Aboyade ComAssembly.
Under the Military administration, mission (1977) and Okigbo commishowever, there has been a blurring of sion (1979. Between 1979 and7994
the lines between the allocation of many ad-hoc changes or amendfunctions among the tiers of govern- ments were introduced in the revment in the Federation. For instance, enue allocation formulae by the milithe MilitaryAdministuation had tended tary administrations through various
to take more responsibilities in the Decrees impacting on the statutory
area of Education, Health, Housing, share of each tier of government.
Agriculture, Water Supply etc., such
Revenue Allocation Principles
that the demand for more revenue
for the execution of these projects Revenue allocation in a Federation
nationwide has been the rationale for involves two distinct strands. First is
higher revenue allocation to the the vertical allocation of revenue beFederal Government. Also from the tween the three tiers of government
late 1980s, it was the cause of ad-hoc i.e. Federal, State and LocalGovernchanges in the revenue allocation ments and second is the revenue
formulae resulting in extra statutory sharing horizontally among the comtransfer of revenue from the federa- ponent States and the Local Governtion account to the Federal Govern- ments. The various Fiscal Commisment.
sions based their recommendations
for changes in the revenue allocation
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system on some principles. Some of
these principles are reviewed below:

The Derivation Principle
This is as old as the FederalRepublic
of Nigeria and is based on the argument that a State from which revenue
is derigOd deserves to be compensated rea-sonably according to lts

t,

contribution. The establishment of
the.Federation Account by which all
revenues are pooled to be shared in
accordance with statutory allocation
formulae had tended to minimize,
although not to a significant degree,
the importance of the derivation principle in the country. Derivation is
accorded some recognition currently
in the statutory allocation formulae
under "special funds" by providing
3.0 percent for development of mineralproducing areas and 1,0 per cent
directly to derivation.
Financial Need, Even Development,

Minimum National Standards
These are subjective principles that
had been recommended in the past
but do not influence the present revenue allocation formulae. This is as a
result of the fact that these principles
cannot be quantified to enhance their
application for sharing revenue.,

Statutory Allocation among State
and Local Governments
The major principles'of revenue allocation among the States/Local
governments are equality, population, social development and landmass/terrain. The importance attached to each of these principles is
reflected in the weight given to each
principle as shown below:
Equality
Population
Social Development
Factor
Land Mass/Terrain
Internal Revenue Effort

39

40.0o/o
30.0%o
70.Oo/o

10.070
70.0o/o

Total Revenue Formulae 100.0%
Revenue Allocation Formulae

Tabie t highlights changes that had
taken place in the Revenue Allocation Formulae vertically between the
Federal, State and Local Govern- ments since 1980 after-the last fiscal
commission headed by Okigbo in
1979.Thestatutory share of the Federal Government had declined from
"55o/o
in 1980 i3 5070 in 1g90 and
48.50/o in 1993. The share of State
Governments from the Federation
Account declined from 34.570 in 1980
to 30.5 per cent in L982. In 1987, it
rose to 32.570 but decline to 30%o and
24o/o in 1990 and 7992, respectively.
Prior to 1990, Local Governments
statutory share of the Federation Account was received through the State
Governments under the State Ministry for Local G&ernments. The
stafu tory share of Local Governments
increased gradually from 8olo in 1980
to 10%o .in L982,1570 in 1990 and
further to 20o/o in L992.
Although the Federai government
-statutory share oflhe Federation Account declined from 55%o in 1980 to
48.5 per cent in 1993, actual disbursement from the Federation Account is another issue. The establishment of the Federation Account
Stabilization Account in 1989'neuhalized the effective working of the
revenue allocation formulae. For instance, in 1990 and 1991 only 72.0
and 66.4 per cent of revenue paid
into the Federation Account was
shared in accordance with the revenue allocation formulae while the
balance was transferred into the
Stabilization Fund. Disbursements
through grants from the Stabilization
Account by the Federal Government
was not done shictly in accordance
with the Revenue Allocation Formulae. In addition, the practice of dedicating some of the proceeds of crude
oil lifting for priority projects denied
the Federation Account much of the
Revenue that accrued to it which

should have been distributed among
the three tiers of Government.

Independent and Internally
Generated Revenue
The Federal Constitution provides f or
the generation of revenue independently by the three tiersof government

in addition'-to statutory allocations
from the Federation Account. The
independent'*even$e of the Federal
Governmenf'tomprises persohal income tax of personnel in the armed
forces, and the Ministry of External
Affairs, operating surpluses of federal
parastatals, dividends from Federal
Government's investment in publicly
quoted compahies, including those
under the Federal Ministry of Finance
Incorporated (MOFI), rent on government properties, interest and
capitalrepayment on loans orflent to
State Governments ahd parastatalq,
etc. Over the years, the share of revenue from independent sources have
been very low and averaged only 6.5
per cent of the retained revenue of
the Federal Government between
1990 and 1995.
The major sources of State Government's internally-generated revenue are personal income tax of citizens resident in their state, fees for
registration and licensing of vehicles,
charges and levies with respect to
Iand development, etc. For most of
the states, totalreceipts from internal
sources cannot finance about 30 per
cent of their annual budgets and
hence, there is a high dependenceon
statutory allocations in performing
their functions.
Up till 1994, sales tax was administered by individual states and the
proceeds accrued to each state government as revenue from internal
sources. However, the sales tax was
repackaged as Value-Added Tax in
1994 and the Federal Government
assumed responsibilip for its administration in order to ensure uniformity
nationwide. Under the enabling De-
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cree, the Federal Government was to
receive20 per cent for its administra-

tive and collection costs. However,
this arrangement was reversed in
1995 with the Federal government
decision to take 50 per cent of the
proceeds while state and local government were to receive25 per cent
each. This was later revised to 40, 35
and 25 per cent in favour of Federal,

State and Local Governments, respectively. The statutory share of the
VAT Pool Account in 1996 now
stands at 35, 40 and 25 per cent, to
the tiers of Government.
The major sources of internally
generated revenue by local governments in Nigeria are property tax
within their localities, licences of bicycles, trucks (other than mechanically
propelled trucks), canoes, wheel barrows and crafts, collection of rates,
radio and television licences, etc. A
review of local government finances
between 1993 and 1995 showedthat
revenue from internal sources accounted for an average of 6.5 percent
of the total current revenue while
statutory allocations from the Federal
Government accounted for 84.9 per
cent. Thus, there is also a high dependence on statutory allocations
from the Federation Account by the
Local Governmentg in performing
their statutory functions

Critique of the Existing Revenue
Allocation System
Criticism of the revenue allocation
formulae tends to be muted under
the military administration, but immediately civilian regimes are back in
power, the first subject that often
generates controversy is the revenue
allocation formulae. It is often criticlzed for its high concentration of
revenue in the coffers of the Federal
Government. Although relative
statutory share of the Federal Government has fallen from 1980 as
shown in Table 1, actualreceipts by
the Federal Government had been
far in excess of its statutory share as a
result of the Stabilization Fund, Dedi40
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cated Projects and the Petroleum
Special Trust Funds that were disbursed by the FederalGovernment.
The 1994 Federal budget proposed
the phasing out of stabilization fund
and direct oil liftings into dedicated

PART III

projects. The Federal Government,
in 1995 budget, discontinued the use
of dedicated accdunts and directed
that these specialaccounts be transferred to the Federal Ministry of Finance where details of revenue and

showed that the federal constitution
had remained suspended for most of
the years. Hence, intdr-government
fiscal relations that occur under military administration do notconform to
the conditionalities of fiscal federalism. However, the paper observed
that fiscalrelations under the military
administrations has resulted in blurring of the lines of divisions of the
taxing and expenditure functions.
These have adversely affected fiscal

accounts for financing priority

expenditure'would enjoy full accountability and transparency. How-

ever, funding of national priority
projects and external debt services
became priority charges on the Federation Account while Petroleum
Trust Fund was established in order
to ensure that the benefit of adjustment in the prices of petroleum products reached allthe citizens. One major
implication of these practices, was
that it denies the state and local governments substantial amount of revenue that should be statutorily dishibutedto enhance the ability of these
tiers of government to provide public
goods and services to citizens in their
localities. This is more important as
there is constitutional limitations on
the independent power of the state
and local governments to generate
revenue. These tiers of government
suffer from inadequate financial resources with consequent inability to
adequately perform their statutory
functions.
Secondly, the present revenue allocation system is being criticized for
its continued reliance on 1963 census data to determine the share of
revenue each State or LocalGovernment would get. The use of population principle itself adversely affects
the prospects of generating accurate
census figures in future.
Thirdly, the use of land mass or
terrain is also criticized that it

is

biased

in favour of States with wide landmass but with thin population while
states with smallland-mass and dense
population suffer.

REVENUE ALLOCATION FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The review of Nigerian expqrience of
fiscal federalism from L960 to 1996

management and economic performance in Nigeria.
Today, allthe three tiers of government are having fiscalcrises resulting
in fiscal imbalances. The federal government fiscal operations from the

1980s and 1990s have resuited in
overall deficits ranging from 2.7 per

centof GDPin 1984to 15.4percent
in 1993. These overall deficits were
incurred in the attempt to provide
social goods and services and were
financed largely by borrowing from
both domestic and external sources.
Domestic debt rose from N11.5 billion in 1981 to about N415.3 billion
at the end of 1995 while the domestic
indebtedness of the government as a
percentage of GDP increased from
2L.9 per cent in 1981 to28.9 per cent
in 1995. External debt stood at $3.4
biilion (N1.9 billion) in 1980 and rose
to $32.6 billion (N716.9 billion) in
1995. The externaldebtin relation to
GDP increased from 3.8 per cent in
1980 to 50.0 per cent at the end of
1995. The country is presently having a serious debt burden with the
consequence that access to external
credit has become extremely difficult.
The Federal Government has relied
more on borrowing from domestic
sources in financing its budget deficits. This hasbecome the major source
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of macro-economic instability in the
economy through its impact on domestic credit and liquidity in the financial system. The fiscal operations
of the State and Local Government
as earlier reviewed are also in fiscal
crises as a result of inadequate rev'
enue base. The deficits recorded by
the States have been low ranging

from N2.2 billion in 1991 to N5.5
billion in 1995. However, much of
the statutory responsibilities have
been neglected while capital expenditures have been abandoned with
adverse consequences for economic

development and growth.
It is, therefore, in renewing our
vision about the prospects for economic development to really examine the cause of government failure in
Nigeria. Theoretically, government
intervenes in a market economy in
order to achieve efficient allocation of
resources so that the economy can
attain equilibrium and thus enhance
the general standard of living of the
people. However, despite the abundant human and natural resources
with which the country is endowed,
the economic performance has been
deteriorating with the passing of each
year judged by the acceleration of
infl ationary pressures which averaged

57.8 percent between 1991

and
1995. Unemployment is rampant with
increasing insecurity of life and property while the economy remains pre-

cariously dependent on export of
crude oilwhich provides over 80 per
cent of the foreign exchange earnings
and government revenue. This itself
is enough to jolt the nation to make
haste while the demand for crude oil

lasts.

If the demand for crude

oil
collapses as in 1986 when the price
dropped to about $5.0 per barrel, the
national economy might be in a serious and worse economic crisis than is
now being experienced.
The objective of this section therefore is to present some proposals for
consideration by arguing that a return to the tennets of fiscalfederalism

4l
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would enhance the prospects of economic development in Nigeria in post
military era. Some of these proposals
are presented below:

Optimum Number of States
and Local Governments
The share of revenue amongthe tiers

of governments would depend on
the number of States and Local gov-

ernments in Nigeria. Given the limited financial resources that can be
federally coliected, viability of the
tiers of governments in meeting recurrent and capital expenditure obligations should guide the nation in
further creation of states and local
governments. There is inevitably a
high level of recurrent expenditure
inherent in the creation of a new state
or a localgovernment. These include
accommodation for the new capital,
creation of executive posts commensurate with the status, provision of
basic infrastructural services, House
of Assemblies and legislators' welfare etc.
However, the limited financialresources from the Federation account
being received by each government,
either state or local, is currently inad-

equate to meet the provisions of
public goods and services. This largely
explains the fiscal crises of the States

and Local Governments. For instance, in the 1996 Federal Budget
the provision in the Federation Account and Valued Added Tax to be
share amongthe State Governments
are N37.0 billion and N8.8 billion
while the projected share of Local
Governments are N31.0 billion and
N5.5 billion, respectively.
If these were share equally (by
assumption) among the 30 states
and 589 local governments, each
state and local government would
get N1,526.6 million and N62.0
million in 1996, respectively. Yet the
average internally generated revenue
of the state governments as a proportion of their current revenue rose

marginally from 12.8 per cent in 1991

lo 24.0 per cent in 1995. Similarly,
internally generated revenue for the
local governments in relation to their
current revenue increased on average from 5.2 per cent in 1993 to7 .9
per cent in 1995.
If additional 15 States are to be
created while the number of local
government units is raised to 700
from 589, then the average statutory
allocation to each state and locai gov-

ernment unit would decline to
N1,018.0 million and N52.2 million
per annum. Thus, revealing the poor
revenue base of these governments
and the weakness of the argument
that the creation of new states and
local governmenis enhances economic development.
Revenue Dependency is Inevitable

The States and Local Governments
are often blamed for depending
heavily on revenue from the Federation Account rather than relying on
their internally generated revenue.
Revenue sharing in a federal system
is to some extent inevitable if the tiers
of government are to avoid overlapping of tax jurisdiction and thus minimize externalities and spillovers. For
instance, if the present 30 states and
589 iocalgovernments were to raise
import and excise duties, companies
income tax and revenue arising from
the control of mineral resources in
their localities, there would be economic chaos as each unit of government would behave independently
to enhance revenue. Hence, the need

to poolthese revenue into a pool - i.e
the Federation Account in Nigeria,
and distribute the funds in lines with
Constitutional provisions to each

government.
The federal government should not
be seen as the owner of revenue that
are federally collected. Only the inde-

pendent revenue collected by the
Federal Government belongs to it.
Other collections by the Federal
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Government,arise from the obligations of federalism. The federal government performs delegated functions by collecting these revenue in
order to minimise the collection costs
and achieve efficient allocation of resources. In addition, the use of levy
by the federal government on haditional revenue sources designated for
the Federation Account, such as import levy, sugar levy, education lerry
on companies income cannot be regarded as independent revenue and
would notbe tenable undera Federal
Constitution.
Review of Functional
Responsibilities of Each
Tier of Government
In order to ensure effective fiscal federalism and achieve political stability,
there must be a review of division of

42
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the taxing and expenditure functions
so that an optimal shucture of functions would emer ge. This should pre-
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development, there is need to restore
the provisions of Federal Constitution

with respect to inter-governmental
cede the review of revenue sharing fiscal relations. This would ensure
formulae as the relative weight of balance between the functional rerevenue allocation from the Federa- sponsibilities of each tier of govern-

tion Account should be related to the
functions being assigned to each tier
of government.
In addition, there may be need to
provide for specific grants from the
Federation Account to other tiers of
government rather than the Federal
Government to take more responsibilitythat could best be performed by
the state or local governments and
demand revenue for its provision.

Supremacy of the Federal
Constitution

If fiscal federalism is to help in promoting fiscal balance and economic

mentand the financialresources to be
used. Thus, the three tiers of government working in unity and coordination would enhance fiscal management and economic development in
the country. The public sector is not
expected to produce private goods in
addition to collective goods and services. But the public sector is expected

to create an enabling environment
that would enhance private investment in order to achieve sustainable
growth and development. This is
where cordial inter-governmental fiscalrelations in a federation will help in
promoting the objectives of economic
development.

ApriliJune

Volume 20 No. 2

. Table

1996

1

STATUTORY ALLOCATION FORMULAE % (FEDERATION ACCOUNT)

1980

1982

1987

L990

1993

L995

1.

FederalGovernment

55.0

55.0

55.0

50.0

48.5

48.5

2.

State Government

34.5

34.5

32.5

30.0

240

24.0

3.

LocalGovernment

8.0

10.0

10.0

10.0

20.0

20.0

+.

SpecialFunds

2.5

0.5

2.5

5.0

75

7.5

(i)

Federal Capital Tenitory

2.5

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

10

10

(ii) Derivation
(iii) Dev. of Min. Prod. Areas

1.5

1.5

3.0

3.0

(iv)

General Ecological

1.0

1.0

2.0

2.0

(v)

Statutory Stabilisation

0.5

0.5

0.5

100.0

100.0

100.0

Total

0.5
100.0

100.0

100.0

Source: Approved Budgets of the Government of Federal Republic of Nigeria.
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FOOTNOTES

1.

David N. Hyman Public ftnance: A Contemporary Application of Theory to Policy pp 511 - 615

2.

Quoted from Fiscal Federalism by Wallace E. Oates p. 16

3.

Prof. Aboyade Committee's Report on Revenue Allocation in Nigeria 1979 Chapter

I

Section 2.
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